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Engelken: Opening the Door to Efficient Infringement

OPENING THE DOOR TO EFFICIENT INFRINGEMENT:
EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE,

L.L.C.

Sheri J Engelken*

INTRODUCTION

Before the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.,' the Federal Circuit's "general rule" held sway:
after a finding of patent infringement, trial courts were expected to issue
permanent injunctions to halt any continuing infringement "absent
exceptional circumstances." 2 That general rule was intended to protect a
patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
offering to sell the invention during the monopoly period enjoyed by the
patentee. The Supreme Court in eBay rejected the Federal Circuit's
general rule, placing the determination of whether and on what terms, if
any, to grant a permanent injunction in the equitable discretion of federal
trial court judges.4
Justice Thomas' opinion for the Supreme Court overturning the
Federal Circuit's general rule is a model of judicial minimalism. The
analysis begins and ends with traditional equitable principles and the
four-factor test for the grant of permanent injunctive
well-established
5
relief.
Assistant Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law.
1. 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
2. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, eBay,
126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006) (such exceptional circumstances are "rare," and require an important public
need such as public health).
3. Id. at 1338-39; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) ("every patent shall contain ... a grant to
the patentee .. .of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention").
4. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1841.
5. Id. at 1839-41. The eBay Court's attempt to resurrect the irreparable injury requirement
for permanent injunctive relief comes after one noted scholar had already decried the death of the
irreparable injury rule. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 687 (1990). According to Laycock, rather than actually require and assess evidence of
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[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must...
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)
that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the Fublic interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
In strictly adhering to such fact-based case-by-case decisionmaking, Justice Thomas eschewed any discussion of the public policy
arguments and real world considerations that led both to the Federal
Circuit's recognition of a "general rule" protecting a patentee's right to
exclude, as well as to modem academic criticisms of the norm that
prevailing patentees are generally deserving of permanent injunctive
relief. 7 Indeed, Justice Thomas went so far as to condemn the District
Court's application of the four-factor test below because the trial judge
had relied on "expansive principles" perhaps rising to the level of a
categorical rule in determining whether irreparable injury - the first
factor of the test - was satisfied. 8 Only in one paragraph in the
concurrence of Justice Kennedy is there even a hint by the Court that
today's environment might warrant some general rules or at the least,
some standards, regarding which patentees should receive permanent
injunctions, and which ones the law should satisfy exclusively with
monetary relief. But that concurrence, with its cryptic references to
"exorbitant fees" and "undue leverage" offered no real guideposts for
9
future trial courts who must apply the four-factor test.
Much ink has been spilled by law review commentators on the
Supreme Court's.short set of opinions in eBay. Some are troubled by the
death knell of the Federal Circuit's general rule. 10 Another questions

irreparable injury, most courts have formulated presumptions and general rules in favor of granting
injunctive relief (just as the Federal Circuit did) to avoid the fact-intensive inquiry that otherwise
would be necessary. Id. at 701-03.
6. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
7. Id. at 1839. See, e.g., Alyson G. Barker, Patent PermanentInjunctions and the Extortion
Problem: The Real Property Analogy's Preservation of Principles of Equity, 88 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 256 (2006).
8. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1840 (rejecting the District Court's "expansive principles" and "broad

classifications" that might imply a "categorical rule" against the grant of permanent injunction relief
in a "broad swath of cases").
9. Id. at 1842.
10. Miranda Jones, Permanent Injunction, a Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not the
Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent Right of Non-PracticingEntities, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1035 (2007); Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v.
MercExchange, 20 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 235 (2006).
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whether that was ever the Federal Circuit's rule at all." Some suggest
that even absent a general rule, plaintiff patentees will continue to obtain
permanent injunctions in the trial court in most cases. 12 Some welcome
the Supreme Court's resurrection of equitable discretion and case-by-13
case assessment of the appropriateness of permanent injunctive relief.
Others suggest that application of the decision by trial courts may create
a new set of problems.' 4 None of the articles focusing on the eBay
decision have addressed the extent to which the Supreme Court's
holding in eBay might further the concept of efficient infringement.
Prior to the eBay decision, analogizing a patent to a contract, Julie
A. Turner borrowed the theory of efficient breach from contract law 5 to
propose that patent infringement remedies be modified to avoid
deterring or unduly penalizing infringements deemed efficient.' 6 The
doctrine of efficient breach of contract was probably best summed up by
Justice Holmes, who famously wrote that "[t]he duty to keep a contract
at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do
17
not keep it - and nothing else."'

11. John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2122-23

(2007).
12. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange: A Review of
Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 631, 657 (2007); Andrei
lancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction Decisions: A
Review ofPost-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 395 (2007); Damian Myers,
Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay v. MercExchange Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333
(2007).
13. Matthew J.May, Patent Reform, Injunctions, and Equitable Principles: A Triangle of
Changes for the Future, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 671 (2007); Michael W. Carroll,
PatentInjunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421
(2007); Sue Ann Mota, eBay v. MercExchange: TraditionalFour-FactorTest for Injunction Relief
Applies to Patent Cases, According to the Supreme Court, 40 AKRON L. REV. 529, 541-42 (2007);
Rebecca A. Hand, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and Effect of a Shiftin the
Standardfor Issuing Patent Injunctions,25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 461 (2007).
14. Gavin D. George, What is Hiding in the Bushes?: eBay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in
Patent Thickets, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 557 (2007); Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath
of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67 (2007); Jeremiah S. Helm, Why PharmaceuticalFirms Support Patent
Trolls: The DisparateImpact ofeBay v. MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 331 (2006); Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns ofeBay v. MercExchange." Did the
Supreme Court Successfully Balance PatentProtection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH
81 (2006); Mitchell G. Stockwell, Implementing eBay:
New Problems in Guiding Judicial
Discretion and Enforcing Patent Rights, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 747 (2006).
h
15. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.9 (61 ed. 2003).
16. Julie S. Turner, The Nonnanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179 (1998).
17. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,462 (1897).
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Illustrating Holmes' point in economic terms, Posner sketches a
typical scenario where contract breach is efficient: If I breach my
contract with A, I have to pay A his lost profits as damages for the
breach. Where my profits from breaching exceed A's lost profits,
perhaps because of a better deal with B, I can make A whole by paying
those damages, yet still come out ahead.' 8 Posner suggests that penalties
for breach of contract above and beyond mere compensatory remedies
would deter such efficient breaches by imposing excess costs on the
breaching party. 19 Absent moral considerations that would warrant
imposition of such penalties, society benefits most when efficient
outcomes prevail.2 °
The same efficiency considerations can be applied to determine the
appropriateness of various remedies for patent infringement, including
the equitable remedy of a permanent injunction. 2' Where entry of a
permanent injunction would impose costs exceeding those that are
necessary to compensate the patentee for the infringement, efficiency
suggests that permanent injunctive relief be denied.
Prior to the eBay decision, the Federal Circuit's general rule meant
that permanent injunctions were entered in all but rare and exceptional
cases, even where such injunctions were inefficient. With eBay's
directive that equitable factors control the grant of such relief, efficiency
considerations relevant to those factors may result in denial of
permanent injunctive relief. A trial court's judicious application of the
four factor test in assessing whether a permanent injunction should be
granted when patents are infringed in such situations may permit
efficient infringements that otherwise would not occur and remit the
patentee solely to monetary remedies. In short, eBay opens a path to
efficient infringement that was unavailable under the Federal Circuit's
general rule imposing permanent injunctions on virtually all infringers,
even efficient ones.

18.
19.

POSNER, supra note 15, at § 4.9.
ld. at § 4.11.

20. Moral considerations are more likely to carry the day in noncommercial spheres. For
example, state laws forbid the sale of children to would-be parents who would provide such children
with good homes and better care, even when the existing parents are unable or unwilling to care for
the children. See Id., at § 5.4.
21. Cf Harold A. Borland, The Affirmative Duty to Exercise Due Care in Willful Patent
Infringement Cases: We Still Want It, 6 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 176, 192-93 (2005) (rejecting the

efficient breach analogy from contract law because it departs from standards of fairness and
morality).
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EBAY's EFFECT IN SITUATIONS OF EFFICIENT INFRINGEMENT

Critics of the existing patent regime point to several common
infringement scenarios that they contend lead to inefficient outcomes
and warrant modification of existing law, typically in the area of
infringement remedies. Commentators have suggested patent reforms in
the context of non-manufacturing patent owners 22 and so-called blocking
patents.23 Such critics make good cases for the conclusion that the
conditions they describe are inefficient, and suggest that, in each
situation, excessive resources are allocated to patent owners, thereby
reducing society's realization of the value of the patented invention. By
limiting the availability of one of the remedies for patent infringement,
that of the permanent injunction, the Supreme Court's decision in eBay
may open the door to efficient infringement in some of these situations.
A. Nonmanufacturing Patent Owners andPatentSuppression
Some patent owners are unwilling either to use their patents or to
license them to others on fair and reasonable terms. This results in
suppression of the patented technology, depriving society of the benefits
of the invention.
The patent owner's refusal to commercialize
substantially defeats the patent bargain and creates harmful externalities.
Disclosure requirements notwithstanding, nonuse prevents adequate
dissemination of the patented technology and the know-how necessary
to its use. Suppression also forces those who would proceed in the same
technological direction to waste resources to design around the unused
patent. Such design-arounds require some degree of innovation, but it is
wasted innovation, a consumption of resources that could be devoted to
development of entirely new inventions and improvements.
In
consequence, the commercial value of the invention is lost to society
during the entire twenty years of the patent term, an inefficient outcome.
When other parties would commercialize such inventions and bring
them to market, nonmanufacturing patent owners bring infringement
actions to enforce their patents against the would-be marketers and seek
the full panoply of remedies provided under patent law, including
permanent injunctions. In such instances of market failure, Turner has
suggested that, to avoid discouraging efficient infringement, such an
owner who has refused to commercialize or license its patent should be

22. Turner, supra note 16, 208-09.
23. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and BargainingBreakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents,62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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denied a preliminary injunction against the infringing defendant. 24 The
Federal Circuit has expressed approval for the notion that a patentee's
failure to commercialize its invention may preclude25 the showing of
irreparable harm necessary for such preliminary relief.
The eBay decision affords a ready extension of this principle to the
determination, after a finding of patent infringement, of whether
permanent injunctive relief should be granted. As eBay makes clear, to
secure entry of a permanent injunction, the patent owner must
demonstrate that it has suffered an irreparable injury, and that monetary
damages are not adequate to compensate for that injury.26 The Federal
Circuit has identified several factual showings that would suffice to
demonstrate irreparable injury: competition with the defendant,2 7
licensees in competition with the defendant, conduct by the defendant
that precludes the patentee from entering the market or licensing others
to enter the market, or some other commercial benefit to the patent
owner from exploiting its right to exclude.28 Demonstrating such facts
would be extremely difficult for nonmanufacturing patent owners who
suppress the patented technology by failing to commercialize it
themselves and refusing to license it to others. Competitive injury is
Absent evidence of a demonstrated intent to
lacking entirely.
commercialize or license before the patent expires, competitive injury is
to the patent owner readily compensable by
unlikely, and any injury
29
damages.
monetary

24.
25.

Turner, supra note 16, at 205-08.
High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556-57

(Fed Cir. 1995) (patentee's lack of commercial activity is significant factor in irreparable injury
calculus and may defeat preliminary injunctive relief).
26.
27.

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
Such competition by the patent owner would include competition with devices not

covered by the patent in suit. Cf Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546-49 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (holding that patentee may recover lost profits for sales of
such devices where such lost profits are foreseeable result of defendant's infringement).
28.

High Tech Med. Instrumentation,49 F.3d at 1556-57.

29.

Laycock has identified categories of cases where monetary damages may be inadequate

and the injury therefore irreparable. They include loss of irreplaceable real property, personal
property and intangible rights; loss of scarce goods replaceable only with difficulty; injuries for
which damages are extremely difficult to measure; risks of multiple litigation; injury by insolvent or
immune defendants; interim uncertainty; and loss of legitimate tactical advantage. Laycock, supra

note 5, at 703-21.
In his laundry list of irreplaceable intangible rights, Laycock fails to mention patent rights. Id. at

707-09. The most common irreparable injury scenario posing loss of an irreplaceable intangible
right would be a request for injunctive relief to prevent threatened family violence; in such a case,
the physical injury to the plaintiff would be irreparable. Id. at 709.
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Hence eBay's elimination of the general rule affording permanent
injunctive relief in favor of an equitable test requiring actual evidence of
irreparable injury is likely to open the door to efficient infringements
where nonmanufacturing patent owners suppress the patented
technology during the patent term. Those who infringe such patents
must still pay compensatory damages, but after eBay, would be unlikely
to face the threat of a permanent injunction. Compensatory damages
would take the form of a reasonable royalty because the
nonmanufacturing patent owner, by failing to commercialize the
invention or compete with the defendant, could establish nothing in the
way of lost profits.
With a reasonable royalty as the "cost of
infringement," defendants would face the same choices as those faced by
parties to a contract - whether it is efficient to infringe (or breach, as the
case may be).
The door is not, however, wide open. Consider a case where the
patent owner does not commercially exploit the technology in the patent
either itself or by licensure, and does not compete with D. D proposes to
make and sell a new device in the same technology field as that of the
patent. D has formed a good faith belief that the patent is either invalid
or not infringed by D's proposed device, or both. D estimates that its
profits from sale of the proposed device will significantly exceed the
amount of any reasonable royalty, thereby making it efficient to infringe.
After eBay, in this situation D would have incentives to infringe.
Suppose a change in these facts: D has concluded that the patent is
likely valid and that its proposed device will infringe. D generously
estimates the amount of a reasonable royalty and offers to license the
patent from its owner for that amount, an offer the patent owner refuses.
It should be equally efficient for D to infringe in this new situation, but
D's decision to infringe after having knowledge of validity and
infringement would open D up to serious penalties. Proceeding with
efficient infringement here would likely result in a finding of willful
infringement and imposition of treble damages (three times the amount
of the reasonable royalty) plus attorney's fees. 30 Despite eBay, in this
situation D would rationally refrain from infringement. The result of
eBay then is to open the door to efficient infringement of the patents of

30. Patent Act 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (2000) (court may impose treble damages and in
exceptional case award attorney's fees); In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed Cir.
2007) (willful infringement required for enhanced damages); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H.
Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming district court finding that defendant's
willfulness makes case exceptional).
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nonmanufacturing owners who suppress the inventions, but only for
those defendants not found to be willful infringers.
B. Blocking Patents
Given that knowledge is cumulative, improvements are often more
useful and socially valuable than the pioneer patents on which they are
based. 1 If the owner of a pioneer patent can prevent everyone else from
improving on the pioneer invention, the pioneer inventor may block all
further development in the pioneer field of technology during the patent
term. 32 The pioneer patent blocks subsequent improvers, including those
who secure improvement patents for their efforts.
Merges describes the inefficient blocking patent scenario as one
involving two patents, a pioneer patent of small independent commercial
value and an improvement patent on the pioneer invention with
substantially higher commercial value. 3 3 Consider the following case:
A's pioneer patent, if commercialized, would return IX profit from
sales. If B's improvement patent is commercialized, the combination
would return lOX profit. The public obviously places much greater
value on B's improved product. Nonetheless, A, the owner of the
pioneer patent, is in a position to prevent B's commercialization of the
improved product unless B buys a license from A. The owner of the
pioneer patent can be expected to attempt to secure as much of the
surplus value of the improvement - 9X - as possible, to the point that its
demand for too great a portion of the 9X may lead to bargaining
breakdown between the parties.3 4
A general rule that imposes a permanent injunction as a matter of
course following a determination of infringement leads to inefficient
results in such disputes between pioneers and improvers. First, before
and during any litigation between the parties, the pioneer's expectation
of receiving permanent injunctive relief would lead the pioneer to
demand an excessive portion of the surplus arising from
commercialization of the improvement patent. "[T]he threat of an
injunction will heavily influence the terms of a license .... In patent
cases it allows the rightholder, not the court, to set the terms of a license
agreement settling the infringement litigation." 35 Thus the likely
3 1.

Andrew S. Baluch, Relating the Two Experimental Uses in Patent Law:

Inventor's

Negation and Infringer's Defense, 87 B.U. L. REV. 213, 243 (2007).
32. Id.
33. Merges, supra note 23, at 79-81.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 77.
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imposition of permanent injunctive relief is one of the factors
encouraging the pioneer to make excessive demands on the surplus value
of the improvement.
Second, permanently enjoining the improver from infringing the
pioneer's patent serves as an absolute block on the improver's
commercialization of the improvement. Despite the high value placed
on the improved product by the public, an injunction suppresses the
improvement, depriving the public of its benefits.
Third, where commercialization of the improvement would be
enjoined, if the improver is to have any hope of commercialization, he
must attempt to design around the pioneer patent,3 6 wasting valuable
resources that could be devoted to development of entirely new
inventions and improvements. For all of these reasons, the Federal
Circuit's general rule making permanent injunctions an automatic
remedy after a showing of infringement led to inefficient outcomes.
The Supreme Court's decision in eBay should limit or even nullify
some of these inefficient outcomes. Where an improver is found liable
for infringement of a pioneer patent, whether a permanent injunction
will be entered will depend on whether the pioneer can make the
requisite showing on the four equitable factors.
Whether the pioneer will be able to establish the threshold factor irreparable injury - will depend on the specific facts. Some pioneer
inventions may compete, even if perhaps indirectly, 37 with the improved
products. Where the pioneer can establish such competition with the
defendant, injury to the pioneer's ability to compete suffices to
demonstrate irreparable injury under Federal Circuit standards.38
Similarly, if the pioneer has been working to develop his own
improvements,. the defendant's commercialization of its own infringing
improvement may foreclose the patentee from successfully entering the
market with his own improvement. Such foreclosure would also
constitute irreparable injury. 3 9 Conversely, if the pioneer product is not
in competition with the defendant's improvement, and there is no active
work by the patentee or his licensees (if any) to develop improvements

36. At a minimum, the improver must spend search and transaction costs attempting to
ascertain whether anyone else has been successful in designing around the pioneer patent, and then
pursuing license negotiations with that party.
37. The less direct the competition, however, the less serious and irreparable is the injury to
the pioneer. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 12, at 654.
38. High Tech Med. Instrumentation, 49 F.3d at 1556-57.
39. Id.
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on the pioneer invention, the pioneer may face challenges in establishing
the requisite irreparable injury.
The inadequacy of monetary remedies - the second factor that must
40
be demonstrated by the patent owner to secure a permanent injunction
- is the flipside of irreparable injury: the fact that monetary remedies are
inadequate is what makes the injury irreparable. 4' For that reason, the
same evidence that would demonstrate irreparable injury to the pioneer
as a consequence of the improver's infringement would also establish
inadequacy of monetary remedies. 42 The first two eBay factors will rise
or fall together.
To prevail on the third equitable factor, the pioneer must prove that,
considering the balance of hardships between itself and the improver, a
permanent injunction is warranted.43 This factor gives the trial court
discretion to deny permanent injunctive relief if it would impose severe
hardship on the improver and result in only slight injury to the pioneer.44
Applying eBay, one federal court has already relied on this factor as
a basis for denying permanent injunctive relief.45 In Paice LLC v.
Toyota Motor Corp., after a jury verdict of patent infringement, the trial
judge compared the irreparable injury demonstrated by plaintiff Paice to
such hardships on defendant Toyota as disruption of business, potential
adverse affect on the hybrid car market, and potential damage to
Toyota's reputation. 46 The court assessed Paice's irreparable injury by
comparing the reasonable royalty awarded by the jury ($25) to the
overall value of Toyota's vehicles (tens of thousands of dollars).47 Seen
in this light, the balance of hardships favored Toyota and permanent
injunctive relief was denied.48
Analogous reasoning and evidence would likely cause the balance
of hardships to favor the infringing improver over the plaintiff pioneer.
Hardships to the improver from entry of a permanent injunction are
40.
41.

eBay, 126 S.Ct. at1839.
Laycock, supra note 5, at 694. "Equity will act only to prevent irreparable injury, and

equity will act only if there is no adequate legal remedy. The two formulations are equivalent; what
makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it."
42. Id. at 703.
43. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
44. Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Reliefin Patent Infringement Suits, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
1025, 1045-46 (1964).
45. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *3-4
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, Nos. 2006-1610, 20061631, 2007 WL 3024994 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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likely to include the same elements present in Paice: disruption of the
improver's businesses, potential adverse affect on the market for the
improvement, 49 and potential damage to the improver's reputation.
Similarly, as the trial court recognized in Paice, where the value of the
improvement is substantially greater than that of the pioneer patent, the
hardship to the defendant from an injunction is correspondingly that
much greater than the injury to the pioneer if no injunction is entered.
Even if the disparity in value between the pioneer product and the
improvement is not as great as that between $25 and the price of a car,
substantial disparity nonetheless may tilt the balance of hardships when
coupled with the hardships already mentioned. 50 For these reasons, the
balance of hardships factor could tilt in favor of the improver, thereby
warranting denial of permanent injunctive relief.
To carry its burden on the fourth equitable factor, the plaintiff
pioneer seeking permanent injunctive relief must demonstrate that the
public interest will not be disserved by entry of a permanent injunction. 5 1
This factor, too, may tip in favor of the infringing improver. Injury to
customers is an appropriate consideration in assessing the public
interest.5 2 In the scenario hypothesized, the public values the improved
product at ten times the value it places on the pioneer product.
Eliminating public access to a successful and valuable improvement
disserves the public's interest in having such access. The pioneer
product is evidently not an adequate substitute, or its value would not be
so small in comparison to that of the improvement. Such considerations
may be enough to prevent the plaintiff pioneer from carrying its burden
on the fourth eBay factor.
On balance, where a pioneer patent is infringed by
commercialization of a substantially more valuable improvement patent,
application of the equitable balancing factors prescribed by eBay may
well result in denial of permanent injunctive relief.
The door is open to efficient infringement, albeit on a case-by-case
basis, and the inefficient outcomes previously identified can be
substantially mitigated. Defeating the pioneer's expectation of an
49. The improver's hardship case is arguably better than that of Toyota on this point insofar
as Toyota enjoys no monopoly on the category of hybrid cars, whereas the improver holds a patent
on the improvement. If the improver is enjoined, the entire market for the improvement dries up,
not just the portion supplied by the dominant supplier in a multi-supplier market.
50. As the Federal Circuit recognized on appeal in Paice, the district court has the power to
order the infringer to pay an "ongoing royalty" during the remaining life of the patent in lieu of
entering an injunction. See Paice, 2007 WL 3024994, at *16-17.
51. eBay, Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
52. Beckerman-Rodau, supranote 12, at 653.
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automatic permanent injunction reduces his incentives to demand an
excessive portion of the surplus arising from commercialization of the
improvement patent, thus leading to fewer bargaining breakdowns.
Similarly, the reduced likelihood that a permanent injunction will issue
may lead the improver to refrain from wasteful attempts to design
around the pioneer patent when what is at stake is a reasonable royalty.
With a reasonable royalty as the "cost of infringement," the improver
would face the same choices as those faced by parties to a contract whether it is efficient to infringe (or breach, as the case may be).
As with infringement of the patents of nonmanufacturing owners,
the door to efficient infringement is only partly open. The same
penalties for willful infringement that deter efficient infringement of the
patents of nonmanufacturing patent owners also exist for improvers who
proceed to commercialize their improvements with knowledge of the
validity of the pioneer patent and the likelihood that the improvement
infringes. Where infringement is willful - where the improver has actual
knowledge of the pioneer's patent and fails to exercise due care whether
or not he is infringing - the penalties of treble damages and attorney's
fees will continue to deter efficient infringement.53
CONCLUSION

By rejecting the Federal Circuit's general rule that prevailing
patentees are entitled to permanent injunctive relief, the Supreme Court
in eBay opened the door to allowing efficient infringement. The fourfactor test for entry of a permanent injunction lends itself to
consideration of all of the circumstances that would make infringement
efficient. The exorbitant licensing fees and undue bargaining leverage
complained of by Justice Kennedy would be mitigated by disallowing
permanent injunctions where infringement would be efficient.
By itself, however, eBay is insufficient to make efficient
infringement the norm. Treble damages and attorney fees remain
remedies in inefficient infringement situations where the defendant
understands the plaintiffs patent to be valid and its own accused product
to infringe that patent. Hence unless Congress acts to limit those
remedies where infringement would be efficient, some efficient
infringers will continue to be deterred, to the detriment of the public.

53.

In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368-69 (Fed Cir. 2007).
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